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ABSTRACT
Ara, Lena. M.S.E.C.E, Purdue University, December 2018. Integrate Model and In-
stance Based Machine Learning for Network Intrusion Detection. Major Professors:
Xiao Luo and Brian King.
In computer networks, the convenient internet access facilitates internet services,
but at the same time also augments the spread of malicious software which could
represent an attack or unauthorized access. Thereby, making the intrusion detection
an important area to explore for detecting these unwanted activities. This thesis con-
centrates on combining the Model and Instance Based Machine Learning for detecting
intrusions through a series of algorithms starting from clustering the similar hosts.
Similar hosts have been found based on the supervised machine learning techniques
like Support Vector Machines, Decision Trees and K Nearest Neighbors using our pro-
posed Data Fusion algorithm. Maximal cliques of Graph Theory has been explored to
find the clusters. A recursive way is proposed to merge the decision areas of best fea-
tures. The idea is to implement a combination of model and instance based machine
learning and analyze how it performs as compared to a conventional machine learning
algorithm like Random Forest for intrusion detection. The system has been evalu-
ated on three datasets by CTU-13 [1]. The results show that our proposed method
gives better detection rate as compared to traditional methods which might overfit
the data. The research work done in model merging, instance based learning, random
forests, data mining and ensemble learning with regards to intrusion detection have
been studied and taken as reference.
11. INTRODUCTION
The convenient and rapid Internet access has been facilitating many Internet services,
but also continues to accelerate the spreading of malicious software. This makes
the detection of malicious activities difficult. Computer networks have been playing
important roles in modern society, however, their security is always at risk. We need
efficient ways to protect the system. Intrusion detection [2] is a technology to protect
the network from malicious activities.
The detection on network traffic is critical in preventing intrusions. Since intrusion
detection is for network data with large traffic size, machine learning algorithms seem
to be a good approach for handling this problem.
Utilizing our proposed data fusion along with clustering algorithms, this research
work explores an approach to identify intrusions on network following the identifica-
tion of maximal clusters of hosts. We have found clusters of hosts that we believe has
given us a more robust model without retraining. The already learned model of hosts
that are in a cluster are merged based on the decision regions obtained from their
decision making trees, thus reducing the retraining cost. The decision regions of the
trees of the hosts in the cluster have been merged to obtain a model. Then according
to our proposed algorithm intrusion detection is done using either the model or the
instance based knn approach.
Machine learning algorithms [3] [4] have been investigated for intrusion detection
in the past years. Many researches are being attempted to apply machine learning
techniques to this area of cybersecurity [5]. Research work by [5] implemented IDS
using ML at application layer where they explain that it is challenging to stay fixed
with the features. They analyzed the payload and the type of code it contains like
Javascript and SQL. At host level, one or more machine learning algorithms can
be deployed on the hosts of a network for identifying intrusions. Generating robust
2learning models from the training data pose to be a critical component for using
supervised machine learning algorithms for intrusion detection. The training needs
to be efficient that relies on the huge amount of network traffic.
Definitely, there are a lot of challenges involved here. These challenges include
the generation of robust learning models, systematic training methods on large size
data and the periodic refreshing of detecting models for showing up the latest net-
work traffic behavior and attack patterns. This research work focuses on intrusion
detection for similar and non similar hosts on a network and new incoming data. For
new incoming traffic, if the network flows are similar with regards to the intrusion
detection, it might imply that these are under the attack by a hacker who is using
the same hacking mechanism to attack different machines in a network. We have
proposed a technique which includes model and instance based approach.
Furthermore, if the network flows are similar enough, these host then can be
clustered into the same group. Finding out the similarity among network flows by
comparing the flows of each host one by one to those of another host is not a vi-
able solution. Hence, we proposed to employ machine learning for summarizing the
network behaviors from the generated learning models. The hypothesis is that if the
generated learning model based on the network flows of one host can be used to detect
the intrusion flows of the other host, these two hosts should be in the same cluster.
Going deeper with the research, these clusters can be merged into a bigger cluster
based on the detection rate of the attack traffic. The ways to merge the decision tree
models of hosts in such clusters have been studied. Merging the decision tree regions
of similar hosts has been found to be the best approach for our work. We have then
compared the results obtained using the proposed method with the traditional way
of using machine learning methods. By the traditional machine learning methods
we mean having a model achieved by training on the training set and testing on the
testing set. Our proposed method is different from the traditional way where we have
tried to eliminate the retraining process for the new incoming traffic and thus be more
robust.
32. BACKGROUND
2.1 Intrusion Detection System
An intrusion detection system (IDS) is a system that issues alerts when malicious
or abnormal activities are detected on a network that is being monitored. Intrusion
detection primarily detects and reports malicious activity or anomalous traffic, there
are IDS that are capable of taking actions like blocking traffic sent from suspicious
IP addresses against malicious behavior.
Significant amount of work has been done in past with respect to intrusion de-
tection. As mentioned in paper [6] two general approaches are popular for intrusion
detection: Misuse detection, which involves patterns of known attacks to identify
intrusions; and anomaly detection which aims to find the outliers from the normal
patterns. Anomaly based IDS monitors network traffic and compares it against an es-
tablished baseline. This baseline identifies normal and attack traffic. Intuitively, this
baseline identifies the sort of bandwidth, protocols and ports and devices connected
to are normal for that network and alert the administrator or user when traffic is de-
tected which is aberrant, or significantly different than the baseline. In the research
work described in [7] misuse detection and anomaly detection have been combined to
detect unknown intrusion and achieve better detection and false positive rates. They
extracted class association rules from training database and then classified the data
as normal, known intrusion or unknown intrusion through the analyses of matching
degree of data with the rules.
Machine learning techniques have been explored for detecting intrusions. Accord-
ing to paper [8] signature based approach has high detection rate but is not efficient
for novel attacks. Anomaly based methods can detect but give high false positive
rate. Using machine learning, a detection model is developed at the training phase.
4In this research, a comparative study of SVM, Naive Bayes, J.48 and decision table
for anomaly detection on KDD99 dataset [9] has been presented. They found different
results for each class when tested with different algorithms and out of the five algo-
rithms no single algorithm gave high TPR for the classes. But they concluded that
decision tree based technique J.48 has high overall accuracy with low false positive
rate. Decision tree yielded a good result with redundant features. Their future work
mentions the use of feature selection with the J.48 for better results. The research
work mentioned in the paper [10] has classified attack types for intrusion detection
using machine learning. The performance has been analyzed using Random Forest
algorithm on Kyoti 2006+ dataset [11]. Going beyond the supervised techniques for
intrusion detection, outlier detection using unsupervised method in cloud comput-
ing environment has been explored by [12] [13]. Unsupervised techniques appear to
be good approach because they do not require any training data set or any kind of
previous knowledge for detecting the possible novel attacks.
2.1.1 Host Based vs Network Based
Based on the location in a network, IDS can be categorized into two groups: Host
Based and Network Based.
Host based IDS are at the host level as the name suggests. The traffic originating
and coming to a particular host are monitored. Apart from monitoring incoming and
outgoing traffic, a host based IDS can also analyze the file system of a host, users
login activities, running processes, data integrity etc. As described in Figure 2.1, at
host level intrusion detection, the hosts on a network can deploy one or more machine
learning algorithms for intrusion detection.
Network based IDS are the types of IDS which are strategically positioned in a
network for detecting any attack on the hosts of that network. IDS is placed at the
entry and exit point of data from the network to the outside world, for capturing
all the data passing through the network. IDS can also be strategically positioned,
5Fig. 2.1. Machine Learning for Host Based Intrusion Detection
depending on the level of security needed in our network. The speed of traffic anal-
ysis is important, since the network based IDS need to monitor all the data passing
through the network with dropping as much little traffic as possible.
2.2 Machine Learning for Network Traffic Analysis
Machine Learning algorithms are efficient way of tackling problems with huge
data. The work done by [14] have used various ML algorithms to compare and find
the algorithm which gives the best accuracy. Their work shows that decision tree
C4.5 classifier gives the best accuracy among Support Vector Machines, Decision tree
C4.5, Bayesian networks and Naive Bayes. Feature scaling before implementing any
algorithm has also been done to select the best features that give most accurate
classification.
2.2.1 Supervised Learning
In supervised learning an algorithm is employed to learn a mapping function
from the input variables (X) to the output variable (Y). The training dataset can
be thought of as a teacher supervising the learning process, so it is called supervised
6learning. The learning continues and stops when the algorithm achieves an acceptable
level of performance after the algorithm iteratively makes predictions on the training
data. Supervised learning includes regression and classification. Supervised machine
learning algorithms like Linear Regression for regression problems, Random Forest
for classification and regression problems, Support Vector Machines for classification
problems are well known algorithms.
2.2.2 Unsupervised Learning
Ensuring the security of large and complex networks appears to be a challenging
task. Unsupervised ML techniques have also been explored in past to study anomaly
detection. Research work by [15] focuses on unsupervised learning algorithms for
approaching the problem of anomalies in complex systems. They implemented Self
organizing maps that overcome the dimensionality problem of network based systems.
2.3 Model Based and Instance Based
Model based approach have been extensively used for solving machine learning
problems. As the name suggests there is a model to predict the output either for
regression or classification. Instance based learning also called memory based learn-
ing is described as the family of learning algorithms that compares new problem
instances with instances seen in training that are stored in the memory. So, instead
of performing explicit generalization, it uses memory based techniques.
As described in this research [16], the central idea of model-based is to create a
custom model tailored specifically to each application. The model can even be associ-
ated together with an inference algorithm. ”Typically, model-based machine learning
will be implemented using a model specification language in which the model can
be defined using compact code, from which the software implementing that model
can be generated automatically”. The key goals of model based approach have been
mentioned. These goals include the specific nature of models corresponding to the
7application. The application might include a combination of clustering and classifica-
tion. Describing the model based approach, in this study they focused on a framework
based on Bayesian inference in probabilistic graphical models.
Model based approaches are studied in a vast area of applications including med-
ical research areas. For instance model based techniques are explored in this pa-
per [17]. In this research they have explored both model-based like logistic regression
and model-free or non-parametric techniques like random forests, support vector ma-
chines for investigating falls in patients with Parkinson’s disease. They used general-
ized linear models with linear regression when the outcomes are measured on binary
scale and follow Bernoulli distribution. Comparing the two techniques their research
depicts scalability for different problem statements. Algorithms like Random Forest,
AdaBoost, Support Vector Machines, Neural Network benefit from constant learning
or retraining as optimized results are not guaranteed.
On the other hand, instance based approaches have also been used in various
applications. The idea behind instance-based learning is that similar examples have
similar label. KNN is instance based algorithm where selecting the optimum number
of neighbors is important. Depending on the data, usually value of k is selected
neither too large nor too small.
83. SYSTEM FRAMEWORK
3.1 Overview
In this research, we have experimented with three different supervised learning al-
gorithms - Decision Tree, k-Nearest Neighbors and Support Vector Machines. A data
fusion algorithm and host clustering algorithm are developed to group the hosts into
clusters based on their known network flows. The host clustering algorithm is based
on the Bron-Kerbosch algorithm [18] which is used to identify the maximal complete
subgraphs (Cliques) in an undirected graph. Finally, attack traffic is identified by
merged model which is a model and instance based technique. Three subsets of the
publicly available botnet intrusion detection data set CTU-13 [1] are used in our work
where first step is to identify the clusters of the hosts with regards to intrusion de-
tection and then integrate the final model. Each of the three datasets belong to a
different bot category from thirteen of the CTU-datasets.
3.2 System Framework
In this work, we have found a generalized model for our problem, so that retraining
efforts are reduced for the hosts. The generalized merged model is found by first
finding similar hosts. The assumption is that the network traffic flows (normal vs.
attack) can be summarized and inferred by the machine learning model that is derived
by the learning algorithm and the training data. If the models based on the same
learning algorithm and training data of two hosts are the same or one is a subset
of the other, these two hosts can be clustered into one cluster. Otherwise, they are
not in the same cluster. However, different learning algorithms make use of different
9optimization functions and processes to generate models. In this work, we proposed
the host clustering algorithm that can make use of m different learning algorithms.
Indeed, some pre-processing steps including feature reconstruction are employed
before the network flows are fed into the learning algorithms. The non-numerical
values for some features, such as protocol and direction have been replaced by iden-
tifiable numbers using one-hot encoding [19]. For example, TCP protocol is replaced
by value 12. After pre-processing, all network flows are used to train the supervised
learning algorithms to generate the learning models respectively. It is worth noting
that the testing process is different from the general training and testing process. The
training process is to generate the model based on all network flows of a host, the
testing process is to test the correctness of the generated model on classifying the
network flows of the other host. We call this testing process as cross-testing. Once
the cross-testing matrices are obtained, they are further used in the Data Fusion
algorithm described in the chapter Host Clustering.
In this research, we applied three widely used supervised learning algorithms: k-
Nearest Neighbors, Decision Tree and Support Vector Machines. These three learning
algorithms are briefly described in the following sections.
Decision Tree
Decision tree learning techniques have been used for network intrusion detection
in the literature and archived competitive performances [20] [21]. There are differ-
ent decision tree algorithms, such as ID3, C4.5, C5.0 and CART (Classification and
Regression Trees). Decision tree algorithm such as J.48 [22] have been used for de-
tecting intrusions as well. The trained model of the decision tree can be decoded and
visualized as a tree structured form. Whereas, other trained models are difficult to
interpret. That is one of the important differences between decision tree algorithms
and other supervised learning algorithms. In this work, optimized CART which was
implemented in python Scikit-Learn package, was employed. CART is very similar
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to C4.5. The difference is that it supports numerical target variables (regression)
and does not compute rule sets. Decision trees algorithm is considered a simple yet
effective supervised ML algorithm. The trees often mimic the human level thinking
which makes them simple to understand the data and provide good interpretations.
K-Nearest Neighbors
k-Nearest Neighbors (k-NN) learning technique has been used in pattern recog-
nition and classification since the beginning of 1970s as a non-parametric technique.
It has been studied extensively for data mining and network flow analysis [23] [24].
k-NN uses a majority vote of its neighbors to classify a data instance. k is a positive
integer. If k = 1, then the data instance is simply assigned to the category of its
nearest neighbor. Typically, we experiment with a different k to find the optimal k
value to classify a given data set. The neighborhood distance function varies from
different implementation of k-NN. The typical one is Euclidean distance which was
used in this work. The k value was 2 in this work.
Support Vector Machines
Support Vector Machines (SVMs) was one of the classification algorithms evalu-
ated. SVMs is a large margin classifier, and has been widely used in many different
data analytic tasks and network intrusion detections [25] [26]. The SVMs classifier
aims to separate the input data using hyperplanes. In order to generate a less complex
hyperplane function for classification, the maximum margin between the hyperplane
and the support vectors which is defined by a fraction of the input data instances
is required. Support Vector Machines use a function called kernel function for non-
linearly transforming the training features from a two dimensional space to a higher
dimensional feature space.
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That means the kernel function defines the distance measurement between the
data points in the high-dimensional space. For example, if the function is radial basis
function (RBF) [27].
k(x, y) = exp(−γ||x− y||2) (3.1)
where x and y represent two data vectors, γ is training parameter. For making
the decision boundary smoother, the parameter γ is used. Another regularization
parameter ζ controls the trade-off between low training error and large margin.
The ability to learn from large feature spaces and the dimensionality independence
make the support vector machines a universal learner for data classification. In our
experiments libsvm [28] has been used for calculating data fusion matrices.
Describing the framework
The intuition behind this research is to identify the known attacks in a faster
way without involving a retraining process like in a traditional machine learning
approach. Our proposed model uses the data fusion algorithm described in below
sections for calculating cross-testing matrices. By cross-testing matrix we mean the
matrix obtained by training on one set of hosts and testing on each other. The
similar hosts are represented on an undirected graph where an edge between two nodes
represent the similarity between them. Going further, the bron kerbosh algorithm
implies the output as maximal cliques which are the clusters found. The maximal
cliques with largest number of nodes or hosts are combined into a bigger cluster
based on their ability to detect attacks. The decision regions of this cluster has
been merged according to our proposed decision region merging algorithm after the
feature selection. The hosts that are outside the cluster have an instance learning
based approach for detecting attacks. The basic overview is described the diagram in
Figure 3.1.
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The final model shown in this figure is the combination of Merged and Instance
Based methods. The approach used in our research work is different than the tradi-
tional model which has all data combined and trained for predictions as described in
Figure 3.2.
Fig. 3.1. Overview of Our Model
Fig. 3.2. Overview of a Traditional Model
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4. DATA SOURCES
We evaluated the proposed system based on the aforementioned supervised learning
algorithms using CTU-13 data sets. These were captured at CTU and made publicly
available [1].
CTU-13 has 13 different datasets, each one is specified for a botnet, and totally
7 botnet viruses are analyzed [29]. CTU labelled the traffic as: Background, Bot-
net, C&C Channels and Normal. In our experiments, we used the three subsets of
the CTU-13 data sets which contain 6 different characteristics of the botnet attack
scenarios, such as ClickFraud, Port Scan, DDoS and so on.
Fig. 4.1. Characteristics of Botnet Scenarios
There are 13 different sub sets covering different botnet malwares with traffic
labels: Background, Botnet, and Normal. The CTU-13 dataset consists of thirteen
captures (called scenarios) of different botnet samples. On each scenario a specific
malware was executed. Figure 4.1 shows the characteristics of the botnet scenarios
as provided in the CTU website. Table 4.1 describes the general types of botnet that
are a network security threat.
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Table 4.1. Description of Botnets
Botnet Description
IRC Bot Scripts that connect to Internet Relay Chat as a client [30]
SPAM Emails about counterfeit goods and security issues
DDOS Distributed Denial of Service attack targets a system denying services to
P2P Decentralized botnet without C and C servers
We used 10, 2 and 13 (I, II and III) subsets for our experiments. Since the original
data sets have all the network flows of the whole network in one file, the flows are
grouped according to the destination IP addresses. Each unique IP address is treated
as a host. After grouping the network flows, we found that some of the hosts only
contain normal and background network flows. Hence, those hosts are excluded.
Only the hosts that contain both normal and botnet attack flows are kept for further
analysis.
Following the process described above, in the end, there are total of 16 hosts that
are selected for identifying the host clustering in Dataset I, 21 hosts for Dataset II and
18 hosts for Dataset III. 10 network flow features out of 13 are used for the proposed
host clustering algorithms. The network flow features are listed in following Table
4.2. For Datasets I and III, experiments are done considering all of the data of each
host. For Dataset II, 75 percent of host data has been considered and for testing all of
the host data has been considered. There are few hosts in Dataset II with either one
normal or botnet instance, those hosts are eliminated in the similar hosts calculation
step, but are included as unseen data for testing.
Before beginning further analysis, it is always good to have a look at the data.
In Figures 4.2 and 4.3, counts of normal and botnet instances are shown for the
Datasets I and II respectively. Dataset II has 21 hosts, since for this dataset, results
are calculated 75 percent cross validation, so the hosts with either 1 normal or 1 botnet
are not considered here, they are included for testing only. The counts of instances
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for each host of datasets are shown in Tables A.1 to A.3 in the Appendix. Data
distribution for Dataset III is shown in Figure 4.4. The purpose of showing data
distribution with and without Host A is to give a clear picture of the distribution
because the number of instances of this host is very large as compared to others.
Table 4.2. Selected Network Flow Features of CTU-13 Data
Features Description
Duration Duration of the connection in seconds
Protocol Type of the protocol (TCP, UDP, ICMP)
DPort The port of the connection destination
SPort The port of the connection source
dTos Type of Service from destination to source
sTos Type of Service from source to destination
SrcBytes Total bytes from source to destination
TotBytes Total bytes of the flow
TotPkts Total packets of the flow
Dir Direction of the flow
Viewing the histogram plots are a quick way for getting an idea of the distribu-
tion of each attribute. A count of the number of observations in each bin can be
calculated by grouping data into bins using histograms. The histogram plot of host
C of Dataset I is shown below in Figure 4.5, where we can clearly see that label 3
(botnets) represented by histogram 11 are very less as compared to label 2 (normals).
We can also see that the source ports represented by histogram 2 with less values are
also very few from its histogram plot.
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Fig. 4.2. Data Distribution of Dataset I
Fig. 4.3. Data Distribution of Dataset II
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(a) (b)
Fig. 4.4. Data Distribution of Dataset III with and without Host A
Fig. 4.5. Histogram Plots of One of the Hosts of Dataset I
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5. HOST CLUSTERING
5.1 Literature Review
Before implementing our ideas, it is good to study the work that has been done in
past. Previous research has been done to cluster or classify hosts based on the traffic
behavior or host roles. Wei and colleagues studied host clustering based on traffic
behavior profiling [31].
Another research work [32] in host clustering has been done by Xu and colleagues.
It includes analyzing behavior of the end hosts in the same network prefixes by consid-
ering both host and network level information. A network aware behavior clustering
was implemented in the research, where bipartite graphs were implemented to model
network traffic. Bipartite graph implementation is obtained based on the communi-
cation between source and destination. The bipartite graph was then divided into
sub-graphs which represent each source or destination host in the network. The spec-
tral clustering algorithm were used to cluster the end hosts in the same network
prefixes.
Some research has used the supervised learning algorithms to classify hosts based
on their roles in the network [33]. Some host roles are clients, whereas some are email
servers, etc. Because of the huge volume of network traffic and overlap among host
roles, modeling host roles based on network flow data is challenging. Derived features
based on the network flows, such as number of unique host system ports, standard
deviation of ports, number of most often used port, number of unique protocols have
been used to identify the roles. However, since host behaviors and roles can change
over time, the learning models need to be updated over time.
On the other end, unsupervised and supervised learning algorithms, using flow or
packet based data have been investigated for intrusion detection system (IDS) and
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anomaly detection systems (ADS) since long. Usually the performance metrics of the
algorithms are detection rate and false alarm (positive) rate. Many researches [3] [4]
[34–38] proposed and explored different machine learning mechanisms for improving
the detection rate and reducing the false positive rate and detecting different types
of attack behaviors. However, the common challenge is how often to update the
generated learning models and whether a generated learning model can be directly
applied to a new host without training process. To the best of our knowledge, our
research is the first to cluster the hosts based on the cross-testing using the generated
models. The following section explains the algorithms that are implemented for host
clustering.
5.2 Algorithms
5.2.1 Data Fusion Algorithm
If the model generated by the flows of host A can correctly classify all the network
flows of host B and vice versa, that means the network flows patterns of host A and
B are very similar to each other. Hence, host A and B can be clustered into the same
group. F1-measure (given in Formula 5.1) is used to evaluate the correctness of the
cross-testing. Given N hosts within a network, the cross-testing F1-measure values
will be stored in a matrix as Formula 5.2.
F1 = 2∗TruePositive
(2∗TruePositive)+FalseNegative+FalsePositive (5.1)
L =

1 F11,2 ... F11,N
F12,1 1 ... F12,N
. . . .
F1N,1 F1N,2 . 1
 (5.2)
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In L, F1i;j is the F1-measure of testing the network flows of host j using the
machine learning model that is generated on host i based on its network flows. F1i;i
represents F1-measure of testing the network flows of host i using the machine learning
model that is generated on host i. Essentially, all the values of F1i;i is 1. In this
research, a data fusion algorithm is designed to integrate the cross-testing F1-measure
matrices (L) of different learning algorithms, then generate host clusters. Given N
hosts in the network and m machine learning algorithms, the data fusion algorithm
is given in Algorithm 1. Algorithm 1 calls Algorithm 2 to identify the maximal host
cluster in a network. Any host in the maximal host cluster are similar to all other
hosts within the cluster. In this work, the hosts within the network are treated as
nodes in an undirected graph, whereas, the edges between the hosts are the similarities
between the hosts. The similarity is reflected by the cross-testing F1-measure. An
edge (i;j) exists only when F1(i;j) and F1(j;i) are 1 for all cross-testing F1-measure
matrices corresponding to the machine learning algorithms. When considering 75-100
cross-validation threshold may be selected a value less than 1, for example 0.6.
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Algorithm 1 Data-Fusion-Algorithm
Input: Cross-testing F1-measure matrices (L1, L2, . . . , Lm), α
Output: Cluster
L = L1 + L2 + · · ·+ Lm
V ertices = ∅
Edges = ∅
for i in (1, . . . , N) do
for j in (1, . . . , N) do
if (Li,j = Lj,i)&&(Lj,i ≥ α)&&(i 6= j) then
V ertices = V ertices ∪ {i} ∪ {j}
Edges = (i, j)
end if
end for
end for
X = ∅
R = ∅
P = V ertices
Cluster = Maximal − Cliques(R,P,X,Edges)
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Algorithm 2 Maximal-Cliques
Input: R, P, X, Edges
Output: Cliques
if (P = ∅)&&(X = ∅) then
Cliques = R
end if
for each vertex v in P do
N(v) = Neighbor Set of v based on Edges
R = Maximal − Cliques(R ∪ {v}, P ∩N(v), X ∩N(v), Edges)
P = P \ v
X = X ∪ v
end for
5.2.2 Maximal Cliques Algorithm
The Algorithm 2 works as Bron-Kerbosch algorithm [18] which is used to find
the maximal cliques in an undirected graph. Based on the training and cross-testing
processes described in section 5.2.1, three cross-testing F1-measure matrices are gen-
erated through applying the three supervised machine learning algorithms. Tables 5.1
to 5.3 present the cross-testing F1-measure matrices of the three learning algorithms.
The rows of each matrix represent the hosts of which the network flows are used to
generate the learning models. The columns represent the hosts of which the network
flows are used to cross-test the learning model to gain the F1-measure values. An
undirected graph based on integrating the three F1-measure matrices is presented as
Figure 5.1. Through applying the data fusion and maximal cliques identifying algo-
rithms, hosts C, D, E, I and M are identified in the same cluster and hosts P, J, F, L,
N in another cluster. These two are the largest clusters within the selected 16 hosts.
Host A, B and H have no similarity with any of the other hosts and are outside the
clusters.
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5.3 Merging the Clusters into One
The maximal clusters obtained are merged into one cluster using the detection
rate and false positive rate for the attack traffic. That means the tree structures
of the hosts in the two clusters are merged so that each of the cluster has its own
decision making model. The data of each cluster is tested on each others cluster
model. Since the merged model of each cluster detected the hosts of other clusters
with detection rate of 1 and very less false positive rate, they are merged into one
bigger cluster. Figure 5.1 shows the merged cluster. The goal of this chapter is to
provide an overview of the implementation, the exact results are tabulated in the
Results chapter.
Fig. 5.1. Merged Cluster Illustration
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5.4 Merged Model and Instance Based Approach
The merged model explained in the above section works well for most of the hosts.
But it is possible that some of the hosts have very different traffic pattern that the
merged model is unable to detect the attack traffic. Such hosts have an instance
based KNN model to predict the oncoming traffic. This is explained by the flowchart
in the Figure 5.2.
Fig. 5.2. Model-Instance Based Approach
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5.5 Experimental Results
5.5.1 Dataset I
Tables 5.1 to 5.3 present the cross-testing F1-measure matrices of the three learn-
ing algorithms. Based on the data fusion algorithm explained above, the following
maximal clusters are obtained (shown in Figure 5.3). Figure 5.3 shows the edges
that correspond to the similarity between hosts, the maximal clusters with maximum
number of hosts are CDEIM, FJLNP and JLMNP. However, for the ease of viewing
two of the three clusters are highlighted in this figure.
Table 5.1. Dataset I Cross-testing F1-measure of Decision Tree
Hosts A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P
A 1 0.06 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
B 0.5 1 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5
C 0.9 0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D 0.9 0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
E 0.9 0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
F 0.9 0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
G 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 1 1 1 0.6 1 0.9 1 0.9 1 0.9 0.9
H 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.7 1 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8
I 0.9 0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
J 0.9 0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
K 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.5 1 1 1 0.6 1 1 1 0.9 1 0.9 0.8
L 0.9 0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
M 0.9 0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
N 0.9 0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
O 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.5 1 0.6 1 0.7 1 0.7 1 1 0.8 1 0.7
P 0.9 0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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Table 5.2. Dataset I Cross-testing F1-measure of k-Nearest Neighbors
Hosts A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P
A 1 0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
B 0.0 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
C 0.9 0.1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D 0.9 0.1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
E 0.9 0.1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
F 0.9 0.1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
G 0.9 0.1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
H 0.9 0.3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
I 0.9 0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
J 0.9 0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
K 0.9 0.3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
L 0.9 0.1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
M 0.9 0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
N 0.9 0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
O 0.9 0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
P 0.9 0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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Table 5.3. Dataset I Cross-testing F1-measure of Support Vector Machines
Hosts A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P
A 1 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
B 0.5 1 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3
C 0.9 0.3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D 0.5 0.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
E 0.9 0.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
F 0.9 0.4 0.7 0.8 1 1 0.8 1 0.9 1 0.9 1 1 1 0.9 1
G 0.9 0.5 0.8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
H 0.9 0.4 0.7 0.8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
I 0.9 0.4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
J 0.9 0.4 0.8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
K 0.9 0.4 0.8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.8 1 1 1 1
L 0.5 0.5 0.7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
M 0.9 0.4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
N 0.9 0.3 0.8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
O 0.9 0.3 0.8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
P 0.9 0.4 0.8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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Fig. 5.3. Host Clustering for Dataset I
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5.5.2 Dataset II
The cross-testing matrices obtained by using Dataset II and Dataset III are shown
in the Appendix Tables A.4 to A.6 and A.7 to A.9 respectively. For Dataset II cross
testing matrices are obtained by training on 75 percent and testing on all of the data
which also includes the subset (remaining 25 percent). Since there are few hosts that
have only one instance of botnet, they are not considered while finding the similar
hosts from cross-testing matrices. Leaving such hosts, 11 hosts are selected from 21
of them. Since the cross testing matrices show good F1 scores, the threshold has been
taken as 1 for Dataset II as well.
The Figure 5.4 shows the maximal clusters using maximal cluster algorithm. There
are 4 maximal clusters with maximum hosts BDOSU, ENO, ENR and HNR.
Fig. 5.4. Host Clustering for Dataset II
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5.5.3 Dataset III
18 hosts have been found. The cross testing matrices using decision tree, KNN
and SVM machine learning algorithms for this dataset are in the Appendix (Tables
A.7 to A.9). Figure 5.5 shows the host clustering.
Fig. 5.5. Host Clustering for Dataset III
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6. NETWORK INTRUSION DETECTION
6.1 Traditional Methods for Intrusion Detection
Considering intrusion detection as a crucial way of protecting network from mali-
cious activities, researchers have been trying to minimize the threat by various innova-
tive ways. These work include combining anomaly detection and misuse detection [6]
using genetic network programming which is a data mining technique. Research work
by [39] have enhanced K-Means [40] clustering algorithm to a more robust method
underlying the fact that if the clusters are empty in initial iterations over-splitting
may be avoided by merging the overlapping clusters, they called it as Y-Means al-
gorithm for intrusion detection. ML algorithms like Multilayer Perceptron, SVM,
Multinomial Logistic Regression, Naive Bayes, J.48, Bayesian network have proved
to give good detection results [5]. Probability based algorithm like Naive Bayes have
been implemented for intrusion detection [41–43]. The Naive Bayes Classifier tech-
nique is based on the Bayesian theorem [44] [45] and is believed to be good approach
for high dimension data. Known for its simplicity, Naive Bayes can often outperform
more sophisticated classification methods. Linear machine learning techniques like
logistic regression has also been used for detecting intrusions [46] [47]. Logistic re-
gression is an efficient way for binary classification and uses predictive analysis for
assigning observations to a discrete set of classes. Unlike linear regression which gives
continuous number values, logistic regression transforms its output using the sigmoid
function to return a probability value. This probability value can then be mapped to
two or more discrete classes [48] [49].
An extension of the bagged decision trees is Random Forests which aims to reduce
overfitting problem. Trees are constructed in a way intended to reduce the correlation
between various individual classifiers. These classifiers are constructed using the
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samples of the training data with replacement. Intuitively, instead of greedily choosing
the best split point in the construction of each tree, for each split only a random
subset of features are considered. Random Forest has been used in past for obtaining
optimal model for intrusion detection [50]. Significant amount of work demonstrates
that Random Forest has been used for analyzing network traffic data.
Random forest has been used for feature selection and SVM has been trained on
the selected features for intrusion detection on the KDD dataset [9] [51].
Considering the significant amount of work in Intrusion detection using machine
learning techniques like Random Forest, we compared the results obtained from our
proposed model with the random forests. We have compared the results from our
model vs the results obtained by a retrained model using the random forest with 100
trees and split points chosen from a random selection of 3 features. Tables 6.1 to 6.3
show the results using this algorithm trained on Dataset I and tested on each host of
itself and Dataset II and III respectively.
Table 6.1. Random Forest Model of Dataset I Tested on Itself
Hosts A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Avg
DR 1 0.78 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.98
FPR 0 0 0.02 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0012
Table 6.2. Random Forest Model of Dataset I Tested on each Host of Dataset II
Hosts A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U Avg
DR 1 0.83 1 1 1 0.94 1 0.83 1 0.34 0.95 1 1 0.33 0.52 0.34 1 1 0.83 0.86 0.89 0.84
FPR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Similarly, the results using retrained random forest models for Datasets II and
III are shown in the Appendix section. Tables A.10 to A.12 show the results using
Dataset II and Tables A.13 to A.15 using Dataset III.
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Table 6.3. Random Forest Model of Dataset I Tested on each Host of Dataset III
Hosts A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R Avg
DR 0.81 0.68 0.65 0 0.23 1 0 0.34 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.37
FPR 0.04 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.03
6.2 Literature Review of Model Merging
Some work done in the past has been studied and implemented for merging the
decision trees. In this research work [52], split point selection approach has been used
instead of tree-growing approaches. They exploited the geometry of the attribute
space by representing each tree as a set of decision regions or iso-parallel boxes. The
merging of k decision trees calls for creating a box set for each of the k trees. As
mentioned in their work, computing the label for the two boxes after merging is easy
when both have the same labels, it is also assigned the same label. Figure 6.1 describes
the merging of decision boxes of two decision trees. One of the strategies used by
them to label the intersecting area is averaging the two class probability distributions
and selecting the class with the highest probability as the associated label.
Another work by [53] is a survey where they analyzed merging decision trees
by data mining approaches. Motivation behind the merging is to generalize the
knowledge contained in the models. A larger data set can be split into smaller parts
either naturally or artificially. Local models are created using local data sets which
provide training examples.
6.2.1 Model Merging Based on Data Mining Approaches
As referred in [52] learning and combining rules on disjoint subsets have been
implemented. An algorithm is used to generate the rules on each subset of the training
data which are used to construct the merged model. A combination of rules that is
34
Fig. 6.1. Merging of Decision Boxes Starting from Upper Left [52]
best for the dataset is used. The approach combines the rules into new rules and
convert the decision trees from two models into decision rules [52].
6.2.2 Ensemble Learning
Ensemble methods utilize multiple learning algorithms to achieve better predic-
tive performance. An ensemble can be described as a supervised learning algorithm,
because it can be trained and then used for making predictions. This method tend to
yield better results when the models are significantly diverse. This method consists in
combining the predictions of various models into one prediction. The ensembler imple-
ments techniques to combine the predictions such as bootstrap aggregating whereas
model merging combines the models.
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6.3 Proposed Approach for Model Merging
6.3.1 Feature Selection
Feature selection is a process that selects those features from the dataset that
contribute most to the prediction [54]. Possessing irrelevant features may decrease
accuracy of models. The advantages of performing feature selection before modeling
include reduced overfitting, better accuracy and reduced training time. Generally
feature selection is used to select the features that will give expected good results after
training, but we used feature selection not for retraining the model but to see which of
the features have the best relation with the labels. Feature selection can be used for
selecting best features or for dimensionality reduction, either to improve estimators
accuracy scores or to boost their performance on datasets. Main approaches are
described below:
1. Univariate Selection: This selection utilizes statistical tests to select those
features that have the strongest relationship with the output variable. In our exper-
iments, we have used the chi-squared (chi2) statistical test for non-negative features
to select four of the best features. Chi2 feature selection [55] is an efficient way of
selecting best features in statistics, it is applied for testing the independence of two
events, where according to probability concepts, two events A and B are defined to
be independent if:
P (AB) = P (A)P (B) (6.1)
or,
P (A|B) = P (A)P (6.2)
and
P (B|A) = P (B) (6.3)
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For using χ2 for feature selection, a value χ2 is calculated between each feature and
the target, and the desired number of features with the best χ2 scores are selected.
The idea behind this is that if a feature is independent to the target, it is uniformative
for classifying observations [56].
χ2 =
n∑
i=1
(Oi − Ei)2
Ei
(6.4)
where, Ei is the expected observations in class i if there was no relationship between
the feature and target. Oi represents the number of observations in class i.
2. Recursive Feature Elimination: This technique as the name suggests recursively
removes attributes and builds a model on those attributes that remain. Model accu-
racy is the metrics used to identify which attributes and combination of attributes
contribute the most to predicting the target attribute.
3. Principal Component Analysis: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) uses
linear algebra for transforming the dataset into a compressed form. This technique is
termed as data reduction technique. One of the properties of PCA is that the number
of dimensions or principal components can be chosen in the transformed result. This
is a good technique if the dataset is highly dimensional.
In our research work, while experimenting with the dataset, we observed that the
attack traffic shows lower source port number and lesser duration than the normal
traffic. A recursive algorithm has been proposed that does the classification after
univariate selection of features. However, the generic algorithm can be applied to any
number of features to be merged based on their merging criterion which is explained
by The Algorithm 3.
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Algorithm 3 Algorithm-for-Decision-Area
Input: Features
Output: Decision Regions
Feature Ranking(Features) ← Univariate(chi2)
i ← 1
F ← FeatureRanking(Features)
while (F ! = ∅)&&i ≤ count(F ) do
Des Reg = Create Decision Regions for feature Fi of all datasets
F = F \ Fi
i = i+ 1
Algorithm-for-Decision-Area(F)
return Des Reg
end while
6.3.2 Decision Region Analysis
Maximal cluster algorithm gave us the hosts that are clustered in a group. We have
analyzed the tree regions of these hosts. Decision tree region analysis is important
for the merging of model into one. The decision tree structures of the hosts that are
found in a cluster are converted into decision regions. The best feature that is selected
based on information gain is at the root of the tree. For example, for Dataset I four
tree structures corresponding to hosts C, D, E and I have source port number as root
node. The tree structure of Host M has duration as root node. Although the root
node of Host M is different than the others, the cross-testing matrices demonstrate
that it can also be used to detect the botnets from the normal for all five hosts. That
means the botnets traffic that hit to these five hosts share the same characteristics:
lower source port numbers and short duration.
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After observing that botnet traffic demonstrates a lower source port number and
shorter duration, algorithm 3 has been implemented for merging. The primary idea
behind this to obtain the lower bound for the source port and duration in our case.
6.4 Merged Model with Instance Based Approach
The maximal clusters obtained from Bron Kerbosch algorithm are merged into
one final cluster on the basis of the high detection rate and low false positive rate
for attack traffic which is given by the formula of merged model of bigger maximal
clusters, tested on each other.
DR =
NumberofDetectedAttacks
TotalNumberofAttackConnections
(6.5)
FPR =
NormalDetectedasAttacks
TotalNumberofNormalConnections
(6.6)
This technique merges the merged models of these clusters into one model. Maxi-
mal cluster identification can help identify the anomaly behaviors and obtain a generic
model which can detect anomalies without retraining. After the tree structure anal-
ysis of the hosts identified in the cluster, their trees have been converted to decision
regions and merged using the Algorithm 3 Recursive-Algorithm defined in Section
6.3.1. The merged model detects the attack and normal traffic from the similar hosts
well and most of the other hosts as well. The hosts whose traffic goes undetected
by this merged model use the instance based learning approach to have their attack
traffic detected. This eliminates the need of refreshing and retraining all of the data.
Instance based learning is also called as memory based learning where instead of ex-
plicit generalization, new problem instances are compared with the instances seen in
training. Hypotheses is constructed directly from the training instances themselves.
So, it has the ability to adapt its model to previously unseen data. They may use
a new instance and not the old instance. K-nearest neighbor algorithm is one of
the instance based learning algorithm. The subset of or the training set is stored.
39
When predicting the class of the new instance, decision is made based on the com-
puted distance or similarities between this instance and the training instance. The
Algorithm 4 proposed combines both the merged model and instance based for de-
tecting the attack. The hosts outside the cluster have a KNN. However, there are few
hosts which are not in the cluster but their attack traffic is detected by the model.
Since, they are outside the cluster, they should be tested with the KNN of the hosts
outside the cluster. For testing with other datasets which is new a new set of data
for the model, either the model or instance based detects an attack, that instance is
considered attack. This is described in the Algorithm 4 below:
Algorithm 4 Attack Traffic Detecting Algorithm
Input: Merged Model of Cluster, Instance Based method of outside Cluster hosts,
Test Dataset
Output: Optimum DR and FPR
for each host h in Dataset do
DR = DR using Merged Model
FPR = FPR using Merged Model
end for
for each host h in Dataset do
DR = DR using Instance Based Approach
FPR = FPR using Instance Based Approach
end for
Consider the best results
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6.5 Results
6.5.1 Dataset I
We tested the algorithm on three datasets where all experiments are done on the
hosts for obtaining the model and host data is used for testing. Using the algorithm
and experiments described in above sections, Dataset I which has 16 hosts, it is found
that there are 11 clusters with 3 maximal cliques with maximum number of hosts.
These clusters have their models obtained by merging the models of their hosts. That
means if hosts C, D, E, I and M are in a cluster, the clusters model will be obtained by
merging the model of its hosts. These clusters models are tested on every other cluster
based on the detection rate and false positive rate for attack traffic as criterion. The
hosts of clusters that give high detection rate and low false positive rate are merged
again to obtain a final cluster. Tables 6.4 and 6.5 show the detection rate and false
positive rate of merged model of clusters when tested on other maximal clusters.
Table 6.4. Detection Rate when Maximal Clusters Tested on each Other
Clusters CDEIM FJLNP JLMNP
CDEIM 1 1 1
FJLNP 1 1 1
JLMNP 1 1 1
Table 6.5. False Positive Rate Maximal Clusters Tested on each Other
Clusters CDEIM FJLNP JLMNP
CDEIM 0.1 0.03 0.04
FJLNP 0.1 0.004 0.005
JLMNP 0.1 0.004 0.005
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Fig. 6.2. Merged Cluster for Dataset I
Based on high detection rate and low false positive rate for attack traffic, it can
be inferred that their performance is good with respect to detecting attack traffic.
As seen from these tables, the hosts C, D, E, I, M, F, L, P, J, N can be put into one
cluster which is shown in Figure 6.2. The most effective way to integrate the decision
tree models of these hosts have been found to be converting the decision trees of
each host to decision region and merging recursively. According to Algorithm 4, the
hosts outside the cluster will utilize the instance based learning, in our case we used
KNN. The average detection rate and false positive rate of all hosts obtained using
the model are shown in the column Average which is the macro average. They are
calculated using the Formula 6.7 and 6.8. Results are tabulated in Table 6.6. Here n
is the number of hosts of the respective dataset. As expected the method performs
well on itself.
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AvgDR =
∑n
n=1DRn
n
(6.7)
AvgFPR =
∑n
n=1 FPRn
n
(6.8)
Table 6.6. Model of Dataset I Tested on Itself
Model Based Approach
Hosts C D E I M F J L N P
DR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
FPR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Instance Based Approach
A B O K G H
1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0
Average
All
1
0
Inter-Dataset Testing using Model of Dataset I
In this section, the proposed method for Dataset I has been tested on the other
datasets considered. They are Datasets II and III which belong to Neris and Virut
bot category respectively. For Dataset II all the hosts were detected by the merged
cluster model of Dataset I which shows that our method performed well with the
unseen data. For Dataset III, few hosts were not detected by merged model of Dataset
I, so according to our Algorithm 4, they are should ideally be detected by the KNN
model of Dataset I. The results are shown in Table 6.8.
Table 6.7. Model of Dataset I Tested on Dataset II
Merged Model Based
Hosts A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U Avg
DR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
FPR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table 6.8. Model of Dataset I Tested on Dataset III
Model Based Approach
Hosts A B D G H I J L M N P Q R
DR 1 0.85 0.6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
FPR 0.04 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Instance Based Approach
C E F K O
1 0.79 1 1 1
0 0 0.5 0 0
Average
All
0.95
0.03
Comparison with Traditional Methods
Comparing the results achieved on unseen data using the proposed method with
respect to the traditional methods including Naive Bayes, Logistic Regression and
Random Forest demonstrate that our method is more robust. Working with our
subsets, a Gaussian distribution [57] is assumed because the probabilities for input
variables using the Gaussian Probability Density Function can be estimated easily.
NB and LR performance is low as compared to Random Forest. Our approach has
results that are comparable to RF. Figures 6.3 and 6.4 show the comparison of our
model with NB and LR respectively.
Figure 6.5 shows the comparison with RF. Although the FPR is lower in both the
cases, the detection rate using our technique is much better than using the random
forest. The random forest model of Dataset III (Figure 6.9, Section 6.5.3) on itself
shows good results but it appears to be overfitting the data, that’s why the retrained
model of Dataset I didn’t give acceptable detection rate here. Thus, our method
solves the overfitting problem in addition to reducing the retraining efforts.
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Fig. 6.3. Macro Average Comparison for Dataset I with NB
Fig. 6.4. Macro Average Comparison for Dataset I with LR
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Fig. 6.5. Macro Average Comparison for Dataset I with RF
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6.5.2 Dataset II
Similar approach has been tested on Dataset II. From the previous results section
for Dataset II, there are four maximal clusters with maximum hosts, BDOSU, ENO,
HNR and RNE. Each of these clusters have a merged model that is tested on each
other for detection rate and false positive rate. The Tables 6.9 and 6.10 demonstrate
these results.
Table 6.9. Dataset II - DR when Maximal Clusters Tested on each Other
Clusters BDOSU ENO HNR ENR
BDOSU 1 1 1 1
ENO 1 1 1 1
HNR 1 1 1 1
ENT 1 1 1 1
Table 6.10. Dataset II - FPR when Maximal Clusters Tested on each Other
Clusters BDOSU ENO HNR ENR
BDOSU 0 0.9 0.9 0.9
ENO 0 0 0 0
HNR 0 0 0 0
ENR 0 0 0 0
Based on the results tabulated these tables, the big cluster obtained is by merging
ENO, HNR and ENR. The final cluster E, N, O, H, R is highlighted in Figure 6.6.
As described by our method, the hosts E, N, O, H, R have an integrated model.
However, the hosts outside have instance based learning methods. The results are
tabulated in Table 6.11. The point to be noted down here is that although the
integrated model of cluster could detect all the traffic for its own hosts (even outside
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Fig. 6.6. Merged Cluster for Dataset II
the cluster) but according to our proposed algorithm, the hosts outside the cluster
should have an KNN towards detecting the attack.
Table 6.11. Model of Dataset II Tested on Itself
Merged Model Based
Hosts E N O H R
DR 1 1 1 1 1
FPR 0 0 0 0 0
Instance Based Approach
A B C D F G I J K L M P Q S T U
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Average
All
1
0
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Inter-Dataset Testing using Model of Dataset II
The merged model of Dataset II is tested on each host of other datasets. This is
demonstrated in Table 6.12 when tested on Dataset I.
Table 6.12. Model of Dataset II Tested on Dataset I
Merged Model Based Approach
Hosts A C D E F G H I J K L M N O P
DR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
FPR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Instance Based Approach
B
0.7
0.9
Average
All
0.97
0.05
The merged model of Dataset II couldn’t detect the attack traffic in one of the
hosts of Dataset I. This host when tested with the instance based of Dataset I gave a
little higher DR of 0.7 but unfortunately the false positive rate is still high. During
analysis of this host, it is shown that this host data has a different pattern for its
features. It might be possible that Host B of Dataset I is under an attack that belongs
to a different category than the hosts whose attack traffic are detected. It is inferred
that, if a more robust merging criterion is applied, our method may become more
efficient and detect attacks from such eccentric data. Interesting point to note down
here is as shown in the Appendix Table A.11 even the retrained random forest model
of Dataset II couldn’t detect the attack traffic of Dataset I Host B.
Similarly, the merged model of Dataset II is tested on the Dataset III. Table 6.13
shows the result using the model based and instance based approach.
Comparison with Traditional Methods
Results comparisons between our proposed model and three aforementioned ap-
proaches for Dataset II are done. Since the results are pretty much comparable to
RF technique, comparison with other two are shown in Figures A.1 and A.2 in the
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Table 6.13. Model of Dataset II Tested on Dataset III
Merged Model Based Approach
Hosts A B G H I J L M N P Q R
DR 1 0.89 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
FPR 0.004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Instance Based Approach
C D E F K O
0.74 1 0.92 1 0 0.5
0.1 0 0 0.5 0 0
Average
All
0.89
0.03
Appendix. Our model performed better on the unseen Dataset III giving DR of 0.89
as compared to 0.81 using traditional method of random forest.
Fig. 6.7. Macro Average Comparison for Dataset II with RF
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6.5.3 Dataset III
Biggest maximal clusters are merged to obtain models for them. They are tested
for detection rate and false positive rate as described in above section.
Table 6.14. Dataset III - DR when Maximal Clusters Tested on each Other
Clusters GHIMPQ GIMOP
GHIMPQ 1 1
GIMOP 1 1
Table 6.15. Dataset III - FPR when Maximal Clusters Tested on each Other
Clusters GHIMPQ GIMOP
GHIMPQ 0 0
GIMOP 0 0
The Tables 6.14 and 6.15 show the detection rate and false positive rates respec-
tively with two clusters, GHIMPQ and GIMOP. Based on the results, the merged
cluster is using hosts G, H, I, M, P, O, Q which is circled in Figure 6.8. The merged
model is tested on each of the host of Dataset III shown in Table 6.16.
Table 6.16. Model of Dataset III Tested on Itself
Model Based Approach
Hosts G H I M O P Q
DR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
FPR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Instance Based Approach
A B C D E F J K L N R
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Average
All
1
0
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Fig. 6.8. Merged Cluster for Dataset III
Inter-Dataset Testing using Model of Dataset III
Table 6.17 shows the model of Dataset III tested on each host of Dataset I using
the aforementioned techniques. The explanations given in subsection Inter-Dataset
Testing using model of Dataset II is applicable here contributing to the high false
positive rate for Host B of Dataset I.
Table 6.17. Model of Dataset III Tested on Dataset I
Merged Model Approach
Hosts A C D E F G H I J K L M N O P
DR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
FPR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Instance Based Approach
B
0.6
0.9
Average
All
0.97
0.05
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Table 6.18 shows the results when the merged model of Dataset III is tested on
the hosts of Dataset II.
Table 6.18. Model of Dataset III Tested on Dataset II
Merged Model Based Approach
Hosts A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U
DR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
FPR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Average
All
1
0
Comparison with Traditional Methods
The results achieved for both the techniques i.e our method and random forests
are pretty much comparable, shown in Figure 6.9. Results comparison with Naive
Bayes and Logistic Regression are shown in Figures A.3 and A.4 in the Appendix.
Fig. 6.9. Macro Average Comparison for Dataset III with RF
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6.5.4 Results Analysis
The macro average comparison among various models for the three datasets have
been shown in above sections. Although the macro average results are acceptable,
if considered on individual hosts level there are few hosts where attack traffic is not
detected by any of the inter-dataset models. These are the special cases discussed
here.
Dataset I: Host B
The attack pattern of Dataset I Host B appears to be different than the other
detected attacks. The attack traffic of this host is not detected by most of the inter-
dataset models except the Naive Bayes model of Dataset II but with lower detection
rate. The performance of various models is shown in Figure 6.10. As seen in this
figure, the FPR is very high in most of the cases.
Fig. 6.10. Various Inter-Dataset Models Tested on Host B of Dataset I
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The scatter plots for this host has been drawn which shows the relationship be-
tween two variables in two dimensions. The plots show the pairwise relationships
from different perspectives and can help in analyzing and visualizing the bot pattern.
Here diagonal represents histogram of each attribute.
Fig. 6.11. Scatter Plot of Host B Dataset I
Dataset II: Host N
Various models give varying results for Host N of Dataset II. This is shown in
Figure 6.12 where using the proposed approaches of Datasets I and III give high DR
and low FPR, whereas traditional retrained inter-dataset models give very low DR.
This host has higher number of normal and botnet instances, the inter-dataset models
using our approach is robust enough to detect attack traffic of unseen data.
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Fig. 6.12. Various Inter-Dataset Models Tested on Host N of Dataset II
The scatter plot matrix for this host is pretty similar to that of Host A of Dataset
III discussed in below section.
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Dataset III: Host A
Similar to Host N of Dataset II, there are few inter-dataset traditional models
that didn’t perform well for this host of Dataset III. These models are of Dataset I
as shown in Figure 6.13. The scatter plot matrix of this host and Host N of Dataset
II discussed in above section are pretty similar. They are shown in Figures 6.14 and
6.15.
Fig. 6.13. Various Inter-Dataset Models Tested on Host A of Dataset III
Pattern of Dataset I Host B appears to be different than the others. So it is
concluded that majority learning is from Botnet behavior of II III. It is possible
that the undetected attack patterns are for DDOS or US bot category. The attack
data detected for Dataset I appears to be of IRC bot category which is the bot
category covered in Dataset I and II. Table 6.19 shows the botnets covered in our
experiments. However, there are hosts like Host C and D of Dataset III where our
approach outperformed traditional way of random forests as shown in Figures 6.16
(a) and (b).
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Fig. 6.14. Scatter Plot of Host N Dataset II
Table 6.19. Botnets Included in Datasets
Dataset I Dataset II Dataset III
IRC, DDOS, US IRC, SPAM, CF SPAM, PS, HTTP
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Fig. 6.15. Scatter Plot of Host A Dataset III
(a) (b)
Fig. 6.16. Detection Rate for Host C and D of Dataset III
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7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
7.1 Conclusion
In this research, we proposed and implemented an innovative way to cluster hosts
utilizing machine learning models and data fusion algorithms with regards to intru-
sion detection. In a network with massive network flow data, clustering hosts that
have similar behavior with regards to normal and attack behaviors will be very ben-
eficial for detecting unusual or anomalous behavior. It can cluster a group of hosts
with anomalous behavior and identify the spread of the attacking in fast manner.
If the network flow behaviors are different among the host clusters in a network,
the generated models of different host clusters can be integrated to become a more
robust learning model that can detect different anomalous behaviors. The different
generated models from different host clusters have been integrated to test whether
the integrated model is robust compared to generating a new learning model based
on the massive network flows over the whole network.
We have proposed a method to merge the decision regions of the similar hosts
in a recursive way for the best features based on the information gain ranking. The
intuition behind merging the decision regions of features selected after chi2 feature
selection is to avoid retraining. In addition to retraining, it proves to avoid overfitting
when tested on new data.
The results obtained while testing the data with the integrated model are com-
pared with the results obtained by traditional way of training a machine learning
algorithm on network testing. It is observed that our proposed method gives much
better detection rate and lower false positive rates when tested on unseen data. Our
work has emphasized on the importance of finding similar hosts, so that they can be
put into a cluster and the model of the individual hosts in a particular cluster can be
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integrated with hosts outside the cluster following an instance based learning. The
integrated method considers both the merged and instance based, the one which gives
the better detection rate and false positive rate for the host is considered.
7.2 Future Work
7.2.1 More Robust Method
In our research, we have tested the results with both the merged and instance
based methods, the considered result is the one with optimum DR and FPR. By
optimum we mean if the DR is good, FPR shouldn’t be too high. DR with a lower
value can be preferred but the FPR shouldn’t be too high.
In order to make our proposed model more robust, a better approach could be if
either the merged model or the instance based KNN detects an instance as attack, it
will be considered attack. It would be better if instead of selecting the optimum DR
and FPR for the hosts, each instance is tested with both the approaches and if either
of them detects it as attack, it is considered attack.
7.2.2 Integrating the Models of Hosts in Cluster
A lot of more ways can be explored for merging the models of cluster hosts. We
integrated the decision regions based on our observation that attack traffic possess
lower Source Port numbers and shorter duration in our case. Probability measures
may be deployed to integrate the decision regions. That means if decision region for a
feature of model A shows attack traffic has value less than a value ’a’ (let’s suppose)
and the decision region for the same feature for model B has attack traffic below a
value ’b’, the decision making node has the value either ’a’ or ’b’, the one having more
probability. Different machine learning approaches other than decision trees may be
explored for integrating
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7.2.3 Dynamic Approach Towards Intrusion Detection
In our research, the proposed method is considered as misuse detection because
the attacks are known. In future, if anomaly detection techniques are applied, new
attack traffic can also be detected. K means clustering algorithm may be explored
for clustering the normal traffic using some distance measure.
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A. APPENDIX
Table A.1. Instances Count for Dataset I
Hosts A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Total
Normal 9045 471 43 42 44 55 33 26 30 48 43 31 35 44 46 41 10077
Botnet 153 9848 1 1 1 1 1 4 3 2 6 1 3 2 4 2 10033
Total 9198 10319 44 43 45 56 34 30 33 50 49 32 38 46 50 43 20110
Table A.2. Instances Count for Dataset II
Hosts A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U Total
Normal 1 10 1 3 243 1 15 12 1 23 1 5 295 5893 9 3 1 8 3 6 8 6300
Botnet 5 2 5 3 2 30 2 8 1 1 15 1 1 785 3 1 1 8 4 5 3 886
Total 6 12 6 6 245 31 17 20 2 24 16 6 296 6678 12 4 2 16 7 11 11 7186
Table A.3. Instances Count for Dataset III
Hosts A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R Total
Normal 20376 18 18 3 1 2 5 30 39 21 16 50 19 26 14 52 58 6 20991
Botnet 7518 35 23 10 71 5 1 3 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 7678
Total 27894 53 41 13 72 7 6 33 40 22 17 51 21 27 16 53 59 7 28669
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Table A.4. Dataset II Cross-testing F1-Measure of Decision Tree
Hosts B D E G H N O R S T U
B 1 1 0.01 1 0.37 0.17 1 0.42 1 0.4 1
D 1 1 0.01 1 0.37 0.17 1 0.42 1 0.4 1
E 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
G 0.4 0 1 0.42 0.28 0.45 0.4 0.2 0 0.25 0.34
H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
N 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
O 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
R 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
S 1 1 0.01 1 0.37 0.17 1 0.73 1 0.4 1
T 0.25 1 1 0.2 1 0.45 0.25 0.42 1 1 0.34
U 1 1 0.01 1 0.37 0.17 1 0.73 1 0.4 1
Fig. A.1. Macro Average Comparison for Dataset II with NB
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Table A.5. Dataset II Cross-testing F1-Measure of KNN
Hosts B D E G H N O R S T U
B 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
E 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
G 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
N 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
O 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
R 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
S 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
T 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
U 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Fig. A.2. Macro Average Comparison for Dataset II with LR
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Table A.6. Dataset II Cross-testing F1-Measure of SVM
Hosts B D E G H N O R S T U
B 1 1 1 1 1 0.54 1 1 1 1 1
D 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
E 1 1 1 1 0.8 1 1 1 1 0.67 1
G 1 0 1 1 0.8 0.6 1 1 0 0.67 1
H 0.25 1 1 0.5 1 1 0.25 1 1 1 1
N 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
O 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
R 0.67 1 1 0.73 1 1 0.67 1 1 1 1
S 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
T 0.25 1 1 0.2 1 1 0.25 1 1 1 0.34
U 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Fig. A.3. Macro Average Comparison for Dataset III with NB
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Table A.7. Dataset III Cross-testing F1-Measure of Decision Trees
Hosts A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R
A 1 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.8 1 1 0.4 1 0.8 1 0.4 1 1 1
B 0.9 1 1 1 1 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.6 1
C 0.9 1 1 1 1 0.7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D 0.4 0.2 0.2 1 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3
E 0.2 0.8 0.7 0.7 1 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.8 0.1 0 0.1
F 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.5 1 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0.1
G 0.9 0.9 0.9 1 0.6 0.7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
H 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.7 1 1 1 1 0.4 1 1 1 0.8 1 1 1
I 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.7 1 1 1 1 0.4 1 1 1 0.8 1 1 1
J 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.5 1 0.4 1 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.1 0 0.4
K 0.2 0.8 0.7 0 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.5 1 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0 0 1
L 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.8 0.4 1 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.1 0 0.4
M 0.9 0.9 0.9 1 0.6 0.7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
N 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.5 1 0.4 1 0.4 1 0.4 0.1 0 0.4
O 0.9 1 1 1 1 0.7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
P 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.7 1 1 1 1 0.4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Q 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.7 1 1 1 1 0.4 1 1 1 0.8 1 1 1
R 0.2 0.7 0.7 0 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.2 0 0 1
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Table A.8. Dataset III Cross-testing F1-Measure of KNN
Hosts A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R
A 1 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.4 1 1 1 0.4 1 0.8 1 0.4 1 1 1
B 0.9 1 0.9 1 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.7 1 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.6 1
C 0.9 0.8 1 0.3 0.4 0.7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
D 0.9 0.6 0.6 1 0.5 0.6 1 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.7 1 0.8 0.7
E 0.9 0.8 0.9 1 1 0.7 1 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6
F 0.9 0.8 1 0.3 0.3 1 1 0.9 0.5 1 1 1 0.8 0.5 1 1 0.5 1
G 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.3 1 0.7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
H 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.6 0.7 1 1 1 1 0.4 1 1 1 0.8 1 1 1
I 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.1 0.5 0.7 1 1 1 1 0.4 1 1 1 0.8 1 1 1
J 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.1 0.2 0.7 1 0.9 1 1 0.4 1 1 1 0.8 1 1 1
K 0.9 0.8 1 0.3 0.3 0.7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
L 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.1 0.4 0.7 1 1 1 1 0.4 1 1 1 0.8 1 1 1
M 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.1 0.4 0.7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
N 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.1 0.4 0.7 1 1 1 1 0.4 1 1 1 0.8 1 1 1
O 0.9 0.8 1 0.3 1 0.7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
P 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.6 0.7 1 1 1 1 0.4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Q 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.7 1 1 1 1 0.4 1 1 1 0.8 1 1 1
R 0.9 0.8 1 0.3 0.5 0.7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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Table A.9. Dataset III Cross-testing F1-Measure of SVM
Hosts A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R
A 1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0 0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
B 0.2 1 0.3 1 1 1 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0.1
C 0.2 0.4 1 1 1 1 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0.1
D 0.2 0.4 0.3 1 1 1 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0.1
E 0.2 0.4 0.3 1 1 1 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0.1
F 0.2 0.4 0.3 1 1 1 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0.1
G 1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0 0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
H 1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0 0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
I 1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0 0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
J 1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0 0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
K 1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0 0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
L 1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0 0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
M 1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0 0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
N 1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0 0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
O 1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0 0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
P 1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0 0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Q 1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0 0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
R 1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0 0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table A.10. Random Forest Model of Dataset II Tested on Itself
Hosts A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U Avg
DR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
FPR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table A.11. Random Forest Model of Dataset II Tested on Dataset I
Hosts A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Avg
DR 1 0.69 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.98
FPR 0 0.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05
Table A.12. Random Forest Model of Dataset II Tested on Dataset III
Hosts A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R Avg
DR 1 0.91 0.73 0.6 0.85 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.5 1 1 1 0.81
FPR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table A.13. Random Forest Model of Dataset III Tested on Itself
Hosts A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R Avg
DR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
FPR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table A.14. Random Forest Model of Dataset III Tested on Dataset I
Hosts A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Avg
DR 1 0.78 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.98
FPR 0 0.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05
Table A.15. Random Forest Model of Dataset III Tested on Dataset II
Hosts A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U Avg
DR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
FPR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Fig. A.4. Macro Average Comparison for Dataset III with LR
